The war in Ukraine, unleashed by Putin, has been going on for almost 8 months. The monstrous consequences of this decision
terribly hit the Ukrainians, tangibly walked through the Russians, and shocked the rest of the world. In recent months,
the inhabitants of the entire planet have regularly observed the menacing swinging of a nuclear club. And the only thing that the
civilized world can now argue about is who it is dealing with in the person of Putin: a crazy maniac or a prudent terrorist.
And if, after all, with a terrorist, then what is the logic of his decisions? What tactical goals does he set for himself and
what means does he have to achieve them? At the end of the week, the newspaper "The sunday times" published a large
article by political science professor Mark Galeotti "Seven unexpected traps that Putin fell into." Mark Galeotti is a British
political scientist and professor at the Center for International Affairs at New York University.
Galeotti is a recognized specialist in international crime and security issues related to Russia and its special services.
In the material that will be discussed
today, the author analyzed 7 structural miscalculations of the system in the current situation.
Let's see what problems the authoritative foreign analyst found in the Russian government.
TRAP ON THE BATTLEFIELD
After every notable failure at the front, a wave of criticism against the Russian military command rose
in the ultra-pro-war z-community. So, the explosion on the Crimean bridge gave rise to a tsunami of reproaches.
They gave rise to the first of the described problems - a trap on the battlefield. What is it about? About personnel changes
and their consequences. Sergei Surovikin, the “Armageddon General,” was appointed the new commander of the special
operation, who received such a nickname for the specific nature and bombing of Syria.
The very ones after which cities, together with people, turned into piles of stones.
In general, it was assumed that the new commander would get down to business!
He will start a real special operation!
But the objective reality is that even the most terrible general needs resources for successful military operations.
And the Russian army has serious problems with resources. The military initiative has long been on the side of the
Ukrainians, especially in the southern regions, and they will use it - they are already using it - to the fullest.
And what is at the disposal of the Russian command? Freshly mobilized civilians with an almost complete lack of military
training and motivation. Well, an impressive supply of missiles - however, exhaustible.
The shooting of Ukrainian power plants, residential buildings, playgrounds and other non-military facilities, of course,
impressed the whole world with its stupidity and cruelty. But the state of affairs on the fronts did not get affected at all.
In the Kherson region, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue their successful offensive.
And exactly at this time, the Russian side is depleting its stock of weapons, and replenishing it, especially under sanctions,
is not so easy. According to some reports, Russia has already spent up to 80% of its Iskanders, the stock of Calibers
has also noticeably thinned. Now the high command is sounding the alarm and calling for saving armaments:
if not for the offensive, then at least for defense. The newly-minted commander,
for the amusement of the public, is pounding with valuable weapons at non-military targets. Generals grab their heads.
The field for further maneuvers decreases with each new step.
POLITICAL TRAP
What follows is a political trap. The image of Putin as an arbiter who deftly balances the interests of the peace party
and the war party in the Russian elites is crumbling more and more, the economy of the regions, already pretty battered
due to the war and sanctions, runs the risk of simply not pulling out the announced mobilization.
It is planned to allocate almost a third of the entire budget for the war and ensuring control
over the occupied territories in 2023. Spending on internal security, that is, on the work of the FSB,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Investigative Committee, the Prosecutor General's Office, the Federal Security Service,
the National Guard, and the Federal Penitentiary Service, will double.
Significantly smaller amounts are allocated to support the economy. In addition, now the most able-bodied, economically
active part of society is leaving for the front, and the most able-bodied, economically active part of society
is leaving the country, and the prospects for the return of the mobilized are vague.
Consumption is declining - no one knows what to expect from tomorrow.
Even the most daring optimists do not plan six months ahead. The brutal bombing of Ukrainian cities was, according to
Galeotti, an attempt to satisfy a party of hawks. Yes, Ramzan Kadyrov rejoiced and issued an approving post.
Yes, propagandists and military correspondents danced on the bones of the dead Ukrainians.
And, in fact, this is it. Joy for every asshole for half a day, zero military sense.
In general, the balance of interests cannot be maintained, and each next step brings the system more
and more out of balance. The war does not end, the economy is hardly able to provide both peaceful and military needs
at the same time, maneuvering between doves and hawks is becoming more and more difficult,
The author called the next problematic place the trap of the social contract. Because the “partial mobilization” announced
by Putin tore apart two basic social contracts on which the Russian authorities relied for many years.
The first is a contract with society. How did everything look in the spring?
“There is no war, but only a neat professional special operation. Live as usual, dear citizens, our second army of
the world will soon achieve all its goals and solve all tasks. While in the fall - "Get it, sign it, we are waiting tomorrow
at 7 in the morning with things to the draft board." And no one cares about your children, work, health,
whether you have a reservation or not. The state has rudely broken into the private lives of its citizens.
It broke in to bring fear, pain, death and material problems -
Support for the president, even in the ranks of
the most loyal electorate, was crumbling. The promise of the authorities not to get into the private life of citizens in
exchange for non-participation in politics has been violated in the most perfidious way.
There is no smell of stability any more, it smells of big trouble. The second social contract, which is discussed in Galeotti's
article, is an unspoken agreement with the authorities of the regions: from you - complete loyalty to Moscow, from the
center - federal money. We'll also close our eyes to your internal affairs.
Now all the dirty work of mobilization has been left to the governors, and public unrest is only a local problem.
At that time, Moscow was waiting for completed mobilization plans and, of course, donations for the restoration
of the annexed territories. And what in return? Nothing. At maximum personal sanctions.
This state of affairs, according to Galeotti, will inevitably become a problem for the Kremlin.
DISCONNECTION TRAP
The trap of separation is about the center and the regions. A strong vertical of power from the very beginning
of his reign was Putin's chip. On this idea, his appeal to the electorate grew. Everything that differed from the concept of
the vertical seemed to be some kind of destructive chaos that would certainly sweep away the Russian statehood.
The regional authorities were required to provide unconditional support for any federal initiatives.
And only under such conditions could these very authorities remain in their place.
Today, the center, in addition to formal approval, requires more money, people and other resources from the regions.
More than they can provide. Demands at a time when the Kremlin is objectively weakening.
Yes, and the resources of the state budget, in principle, are reduced. What do local elites do in this situation?
They certainly do not care about the interests of the center - rather, they are frantically stuffing their own pockets.
At the same time, not forgetting to nod that, they say, yes, we approve and support. Mark Galeotti cites leaks from an
internal report by the Investigative Committee that shows a marked increase in embezzlement by regional elites.
It would be strange to expect otherwise from a system built on lies, postscripts and theft.
THE LEVERAGE TRAP
Now let's talk about leverage and the corresponding trap for Putin. In a healthy political system, regional authorities
represent the interests of their residents and their voters before the federal center.
In modern Russia, the opposite is true: the authorities of the regions and republics, together with the population,
are a resource. Well, like oil or gas. A resource that can be used to the maximum in a war without
giving anything in return. Attempts by the head of Dagestan, Sergei Melikov, to get the Kremlin to take a breather
in mobilization were unsuccessful - despite the huge (according to Meduza, the largest in Russia)
losses in the war, despite serious protests. But Moscow is not interested in problems - it needs results.
The objective reality is this: Putin is in dire need of the loyalty of the regions.
And, according to Galeotti, this is a lever in the hands of regional leaders.
For example, Ramzan Kadyrov has been using this leverage for a long time and quite successfully.
It is known that federal subsidies make up 80% of Chechnya's budget.
Moscow generously pays for any desires of the Chechen leader, fearing separatist chaos.
And not unreasonably, I must say, given the background of the republic.
And now Russia cannot afford a new civil war in the southern outskirts.
GANGSTER TRAP
Remember, we talked about the inevitable increase in crime in connection with the war?
It has another aspect, the author of the article calls it a gangsterism trap. Simply put, it's a bandit trap.
Mark Galeotti believes that the entire system of Putin's power for years was built on playing off the elites.
Encouraging quiet squabbling for power and money by placing yourself in the position of the main arbiter in these
fights is nothing new, “divide and conquer”. But now Putin is too busy with the war with Ukraine.
And the squabbling becomes loud, conflicts become open, and the means of their conduct become frankly gangster.
The author suggests that the swept wave of mysterious suicides among major businessmen and officials is evidence
that murder as a working tool for doing business is again relevant.
Or, for example, public and completely insulting threats from Kadyrov and Prigozhin against Defense Minister Shoigu or
generals in command of entire fronts. Not a discussion of officials, but some kind of squabble in a bar.
It seems that the signs of civilization no longer affect these people. And the next step is to wait for a public massacre
and a shootout under the walls of the Kremlin. Tatarstan has its own rattles.
Regional leader Rustam Minnikhanov knows that his oil assets are the focus of the Kremlin's scrutiny.
And the entrusted to him Tatarstan is generally under an extra control by the federal authorities.
An economically successful national republic has long been an indicator of various kinds of tension,
whether regional or ethnic. So Minnikhanov has to look in all directions at once: no matter how bad something happens.
The country is rapidly slipping into a reality where the price of a miscalculation in the struggle of the elites is not money,
not influence, not even freedom, but life, the physical existence of a particular person and his relatives.
TRAPS WITHIN TRAPS
The final problem described in the article is nested, non-obvious traps inside other traps.
According to the British political scientist, today it is impossible to talk about real threats
to the existence of the regime. The systems built over the thirty years of Putin's rule creak, stagger, but still work.
And competition for the favor of the president within the elites still exists, and there is no talk of any opposition associations.
But there are cracks in the system. And as there are more of them, stress is growing: in all branches of government
and in society as a whole. Under these conditions, real rather than demonstrative efforts of the elite are more likely to focus
on their own interests. According to the same closed report of the Investigative Committee, to which Galeotti refers,
it is estimated that up to a quarter of the funds allocated for mobilization may already be stolen on the ground.
And, judging by the numerous testimonies, how the mobilized warm themselves by the fires, spend the night
in the open air and get their own uniforms and dressings, it is easy to believe in this.
The system of governing the country built by Putin was a poor, but conditionally suitable mechanism
in those uniquely favorable life circumstances in which it grew and strengthened. But the current test of a real war,
it withstands with great difficulty. It still works, but already makes noise, smokes and stalls at times.
Each of the traps described by Galeotti has not yet closed. But the space for any maneuvers is already very limited.
And there seems to be no way back.
See you tomorrow.