The hot topic these days is the upcoming offensive of the Ukrainian army (AFU).
It may get confusing: who sent how many tanks to Ukraine and who didn’t. And what about fighter jets?
Experts predict various dates and directions of the attack.
It happens as the frontlines are locked into a stalemate, and tough battles are fought around Bakhmut.
Everyone tries to figure out what Ukraine can do for their spring-summer campaign, and what Russian
generals can respond with. That calls for evaluating the current status of the opposing sides and issues they face.
For this video, we’ve assembled more or less reliable information that’s available.
We’ve tried to abstain from propaganda and look for real sources to provide you with an accurate evaluation. Let’s roll.
DISPOSITION
As we speak, the Russian offensive at Bakhmut and Avdiivka is petering out.
It’s safe to say the offensive has drawn a blank. The Russian troops have failed to break through the Ukrainian defenses.
They couldn’t contain Ukrainian forces and thwart Kyiv's plans for a future offensive.
The AFU have held the front at Kupiansk, Liman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.
The Russian offensive has boiled down to inching forward at Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
All other attacks were mere distractions.
Their goal was to make the AFU spread their resources along the frontline and prevent them
from building up their forces at the key battle positions.
Bakhmut and Avdiivka are such spots.
Fierce battles are raging on for every stockade, every trench, every house, and industrial facility.
The Russian side is critically lacking artillery support. It can no longer afford to demolish concrete structures
at the frontline in one go. Instead, they have to be stormed by infantry armored vehicles.
Last month, the world saw footage of Russian vehicles blown up by mines at Vuhledar.
The 155th Separate Marine Brigade sustained heavy casualties to clear a fraction of minefields near Vuhledar.
As the battle for this tiny town unfolded, a video appeared of a Russian tank crew seeking cover in a crater,
only to stumble upon a Russian soldier bleeding for two days straight.
Russian pro-war voices like Igor Strelkov-Girkin consistently slam such useless assaults.
Year-long combat at Avdiivka and Marinka has been churning out dead souls on an industrial scale.
A battalion of 500-odd soldiers on paper have to get by with 200–300 fighters at best.
Russian jingoist media portray it as follows.
The high command orders a company to launch an assault on Ukrainian fortifications.
The company consists of three soldiers instead of a hundred.
The company commander disobeys the order and is court- martialed. One soldier is killed, and the last one is wounded.
And here he is, supine in the field, asking for backup. The response he gets is,
“There’s a hundred of you there, make do.” Such narrative captures the real vibes quite accurately.
The Russian command takes over a yard of land at a cost of a hundred lives, and wastes dozens of armored vehicles daily.
Not a single important mission has been completed. Not a single target city has been taken.
And that’s when Ukraine has yet to deploy the fresh manpower that are being trained to use modern Western hardware.
They’re still in bootcamps in Europe. Just you wait.
Ukraine has also paid a heavy price to keep its offensive capabilities.
First, the AFU also experience a shortage of shells and landmines.
Ukrainian soldiers are forced to engage in close combat.
As a result, soldiers are drowning in expended shell casings in their trenches.
Second, the AFU’s casualty count has been appalling, too.
So substantial in fact that Ukrainian and Western generals disagree in their assessment of the Battle of Bakhmut.
The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, suggested that Ukrainians retreat.
But the AFU keep manning the frontlines to stop the Russian advance at Bakhmut.
They deployed American M113s and their Dutch version. Later on, Mark Milley, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
admitted that the Ukrainian defense positions were secured.
But progress came at a chilling price. In March, the Washington Post reported on the AFU’s condition and morale.
The article featured comments of a Ukrainian brigade commander.
The officer told the journalists that his battalion is regularly replenished by poorly trained soldiers
that rapidly get roughed up in action.
According to him, 100 out of 500 soldiers on his watch were killed, with the remaining 400 wounded.
A hundred reinforcements subbed them in, but only one officer was a career servicemember.
In the end, the brigade was no longer an active military unit, and its commander,
who had served in the AFU for the entire nine years of the war, had to resign for leaking the situation to the media.
Ukrainian military analysts have indirectly confirmed his words. Nikolai Beleskov said that losses, injuries,
and emotional fatigue drove the AFU to plug the gaps on the battlefield by homeland defense troops.
That rendered Bakhmut a setting for a gruesome trade-off.
The AFU keep up the defenses only because the losses ratio is in their favor,
which is due to their defensive positions and the city’s layout.
The Wagner Group combatants are stuck there to an extent where its founder now cajoles his nemesis,
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, into providing flank support.
Otherwise, the Wagner Group risks being encircled by the growing Ukrainian force.
There are no significant counterattacks from the Ukrainian side, though.
Beleskov claims that the Ukrainian army is currently in a transition period.
On the one hand, it has been beefed up with homeland defense reinforcements.
He estimates the number of these new troops at 130,000.
It’s less than 15% of the entire Ukrainian defense troops, including the police, the special forces, and the border patrol.
On the other hand, the search is on for qualified officers to lead the newly formed companies and battalions.
The officers that call the shots on the ground.
To tackle this personal shortage in the army, the Ukrainian parliament went overboard.
For the period of war, it authorized promoting soldiers with combat experience
but no military school training to officer ranks.
These people will be facing military red tape, no doubt. But such an inspiring example of upward mobility may
significantly boost the Ukrainian forces, rendering them more effective and open-minded.
The upcoming Ukrainian offensive has an even larger political angle.
The AFU want to undermine the war of attrition narrative that dominates the Western media.
The Western observers report that the war has reached the point where neither side is able to tip the scale.
Ukraine’s Western allies need to witness the efficiency of the AFU to spur further military and economic aid.
Beleskov, however, advises against jumping the gun.
He believes the AFU will possess the resources for one large-scale offensive.
If it turns out successful, it’ll strengthen Kyiv’s negotiation leverage.
Not in parleying with Moscow, though, but in dealing with its allies. Ukraine’s priority is security assurances.
Kyiv naturally strives to prevent possible future Russian aggression, set up a peaceful life, restore the economy,
and return the refugees. In short, it seeks to provide Ukraine with a shot at a decent life.
Ukraine’s membership in NATO is off the table yet, but Western analysts propose alternative scenarios.
NATO, for instance, could sign a long-term agreement with Ukraine on arms supply and manufacturing.
Of course, it’s only speculation. But some aid to support the Ukrainian offensive is already on its way.
PREP FOR AN OFFENSIVE
Importantly, Europe seeks ways to solve the AFU’s issue with ammunition shortage.
A million of 155mm shells are scheduled to be provided for Ukraine. It’s triple the amount sent over the past year.
Kyiv is going to be supplied with new ammo for at least a year.
Meanwhile, according to the U.S. media, Washington struggles to step up the production of said ammo.
Mind you, we only speak of the 155mm shells. It’s expected to become Ukraine’s military standard.
As of now, the AFU is busy getting rid of its Soviet artillery and expending the last remaining
Soviet shells from Europe’s storage facilities.
The problem of continuous supply of ammunition is yet to be sorted out.
But it’s perfectly clear that Ukraine will have artillery shells enough for a year of war.
Moreover, the previous two American military aid packages solely consisted of ammunition for artillery,
HIMARS, battle tanks, and even M2 Bradleys. In an unprecedented move, the real figures were classified.
The Russian side has nothing to show for it.
We don’t expect the Russian top brass to hold serious discussion on supplying the frontlines.
But the fact that jingoists like Igor Strelkov-Girkin rely solely on fanciful “Chinese lend-lease” is quite telling.
Second, Ukraine has received a record supply of armored vehicles.
Lloyd Austin announced the AFU would get 150-odd Leopard tanks and about a hundred Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
And these are just official figures. The Leopards and Bradleys are already on their way to Ukraine.
Kyiv received the first batch in early January.
At the same time, the AFU are getting their first Leopards from Poland and Norway as well.
Poland and Spain are training Ukrainian crews to operate these machines.
Ukrainian media outlets report the drills are almost completed.
The training program is intensive, since there’s no time to waste. The steppes of Ukraine have defrosted.
Everyone’s waiting for the end of the rain and slush season. It may take about a month.
If Lloyd Austin’s promised armored aid to Ukraine is any indication and if it is indeed intended for the
Ukrainian offensive, the spring season doesn’t bode well for the Russian army.
The toughest issue for Ukraine is still airpower. Ukraine requests F-16 fighter jets from the U.S.,
but the negotiations have stalled.
Some of the American generals question the possibility of breaking through Russian air defense on the frontlines.
In the meantime, Ukraine is receiving Soviet MiGs with upgraded Israeli-made avionics from Slovakia and Poland.
The big question of the exact location of the upcoming offensive seems to be agreed on by all the analysts.
It’s going to be in the south. A successful attack on Melitopol, Berdyansk, Mariupol,
or all of them at once is expected to result in the AFU’s advance to the Sea of Azov and to divide
the Russian front in two.
That would force the Russian command to deal with two separate groups of its troops:
the one in Crimea and the one in the Donbas.
They’ll be facing difficulties with supplies that will have to detour through the Crimean Bridge.
This plan would only require advancing for about 50-55 miles through flatlands with no significant urban localities capable
of stalling the offensive for months. Just as the Russian army has been stalled out in the Donbas.
To dismiss such an obvious scenario, one has to have an even more tempting alternative.
It does exist, though: it’s the Luhansk Region.
There are only leveled grasslands with no townships in between the current frontlines and Luhansk.
By the way, there doesn't have to be a single direction for the attack.
The art of war requires decoy or auxiliary blows for the enemy to spread the resources and lose
the momentum until they identify the direction of the main assault.
Many signs suggest an attack in the south, though.
There’s been an increasing number of phone calls between the two commanders-in-chief,
Mark Milley and Valerii Zaluzhnyi, featuring two generals responsible for certain parts of the front.
One of them, Oleksandr Tarnavskyy, commands the southern group of the AFU that currently isn’t engaged in major battles.
The AFU have already started testing the waters in the south.
The formation’s spokesman directly linked them to counteroffensive preparations.
Either way, the sheer amount of resources involved suggests that the Ukrainian counterattack is likely
to be bigger than it was last fall. We may witness one of the largest land military operations in Europe since WW2.
Which means that the Russian army is about to face its biggest challenge in modern history.
RUSSIAN COUNTERMEASURES
What is the Russian command doing to prepare for the offensive? Nothing, as far as we can tell.
The Russian army still falls behind the Ukrainian one in communications and intelligence.
There are no signals to assume the ammunition shortage is being dealt with.
It’s widely considered that defense is always easier than offense.
But the defending side has to rely heavily on a network of powerful engineering fortifications.
Deep trenches and dugouts inaccessible for enemy fire, capable of fitting all the defenders.
As of now, the Russian army can’t beat the AFU in defensive preparations.
However, satellite images show the emergence of heavy fortifications in the south, at the frontline and at the back,
next to the coastal city of Berdyansk.
Similar trenches on the bank of the Kakhovka reservoir and by the city of Zaporizhzhia can be seen
in the message posted by the perpetually sassy pro-war reporter Alexander Sladkov.
He was slammed by his own peers, including pro-war blogger Andrei Morozov
who has been fighting in the Donbas for nine years.
Morozov pointed out the trenches' flaws. First, they aren’t deep enough, and require quite a bit of hunching.
Second, they’re a straight line stretching for many yards.
If an enemy soldier gets into it, he may single-handedly shoot down everyone before the next curve.
It will be tricky to defend such positions.
The AFU have mastered the art of digging deep and twisting trenches since 2015.
They allow them to isolate the enemy who made it inside and take cover from the fire.
Moreover, the Russian trenches are dug by civil, not military engineers.
It’d be understandable if the frontline was rapidly moving back, and setting up trenches in time was paramount.
But the frontline at Zaporizhzhia hasn’t budged since April 2022.
Long story short, there was enough time to set up the defenses.
It doesn’t take a military genius to realize egregious mistakes.
In the entire south, from Kakhovka Reservoir to Vuhledar, the Russian fortifications don't form an uninterrupted defense line.
Also, the Russian command has almost lost the ability to hit the AFU formations at the frontlines with artillery.
The targets are out of reach. The airpower would assist, but it’s unable to penetrate the air defense line.
And wasting Iskander ballistic missiles on a dozen of soldiers is a boondoggle.
The Russian command’s only way to mess up the AFU plans is to destroy the offensive logistics
by high-precision missile strikes. For instance, to hit fuel depots or armored vehicle repair shops.
But for these attacks to bear any fruit, they must be regular. And there’s a problem here.
Russia’s missile stock has seen better days since the war on Ukrainian power plants was declared.
Now, 60 to 70 missiles required for a successful strike have to be mustered up from across the country, which takes weeks.
The Ukrainian intelligence reported recently that the Russian rocketmen may finally shift their focus to military objects.
Meanwhile, Kyiv is constantly reinforcing its air defenses.
According to the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, over 80% of Russian missiles and Shahed drones
are being downed.
But it may not be enough to stop Russia from thwarting Ukraine’s preparations for the counteroffensive.
We’re witnessing a unique stage of the war. For the first time, we’re about to see Russia fending off
a large-scale Ukrainian offensive.
The AFU’s operations in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions were classic counterattacks.
Back then, Ukraine seized the moment to use its resources for a short assault, while the enemy was advancing elsewhere.
Things are completely different now. Everyone knows the offensive will take place.
Everyone knows roughly where and when it’ll happen.
And the Russian army can’t do anything to delay its biggest challenge over the last 30 years or attack to prevent it.
The expected counteroffensive of the AFU is the decisive stage of the war.
For the first time in its history, the Russian army is going to act in strategic defense against a comparable military force.
If the Russian troops find ways to stand against an army largely equipped by the standards of NATO,
it’ll mean that Putin possesses the resources required to drag out the war. Not for winning, but for prolonging it.
But if the AFU backed by the Western intelligence and supplies accomplish their goal,
if they manage to stun the Russian army, the collapse of the front will follow like an avalanche.
The Russian troops will lose their morale and won’t be able or willing to defend a foreign land.
In this case, the timing for the war’s end will depend entirely on the speed of the Ukrainian advance,
neglecting sporadic resistance of the Russian troops.
Let’s see what will happen.
See you tomorrow!