A plethora of sources report the Russian establishment discarded the idea of forced mass mobilization and, instead,
opted for recruiting volunteers through a massive promo campaign.
It will feature ventures by regional authorities as well as state-owned companies.
We’ve been postponing the discussion of this topic. We needed some solid evidence.
The government’s plans disclosed by insiders and leaks but not confirmed officially tend to be flaky.
Yesterday, however, a regular conscription campaign kicked off.
For the time being, that’ll render enlistment officers too busy for the mobilization.
Also, signs of a large-scale propaganda campaign seeking volunteers are looming.
So I think it makes sense to discuss why Putin made such an odd decision in such a desperate situation.
It has more to do with politics rather than a military strategy.
MOBILIZATION DRIVE & UPSHOTS
From an outside perspective, the first wave of mobilization last fall may have seemed even successful.
True, it spurred some local protests, but no mass civil unrest. Hundreds of thousands of Russians have fled the country,
but who cares, as long as those who’ve stayed keep their mouths shut?
It achieved what was expected from it by honest experts.
It hasn’t yielded any victories, but has prevented a total collapse of the front due to the sheer influx of manpower.
Simple evaluation of the initial data brings us to the same conclusion military experts have drawn:
the second wave of mobilization is inevitable.
One, the first wave was successful. Two, its success was offset by significant loss of personnel.
Three, the Ukrainian counteroffensive is upcoming.
Four, the government machine has clearly been gearing up for the second wave.
Late last year saw unprecedented efforts in the listing, drafting of regulatory documents,
and digitization of the enlistment offices’ workflow.
Not least of all, five, state-owned companies, regional authorities, universities,
and other institutions normally involved in the draft activities have been presented with relevant guidelines.
We don’t know if Ukraine predicted the new wave to begin on January 15, 2023, based on real intel data,
or if it was a mere guesstimate.
Such an assumption made a lot of sense, though.
For the Russian army to be prepared for the spring campaign, midwinter was the latest deadline to start the mobilization.
That was also the time the enlistment offices concluded the regular fall conscription campaign,
and had the capabilities to resume the mobilization.
Neither January 15, nor late January, nor the day of Putin’s address to the parliament,
nor the war anniversary, nor the middle of March saw any announcements.
Traditionally, as soon as the TV cameras caught sight of Putin, the cost of flights to foreign destinations would shoot up,
but that was as uncomfortable as it got.
But why so? Why did Putin shun the decision that is absolutely unavoidable on his worldview?
This question is much more interesting upon thorough examination.
The answer to it contradicts the reality we’re used to.
We know a single reason for Putin to refrain from an obvious move.
That is if he considers the upshots of mobilization to be far more perilous than the issues it addresses.
What could be worse than another collapse of the front?
What’s worse than skedaddling from the provinces that have been proclaimed “eternally Russian” not so long ago?
Protests on the outskirts of the country?
Traffic jams at the Russian-Georgian border?
A surge in anxiety shown by opinion polls? Since when does he care about these things?
We may be witnessing a unicorn-rare occasion when the reality in the updates Putin receives from his toadies
is much more dire than the one announced publicly. It seems like the system holds itself in lower esteem than we do.
What is it then? FSB’s memos? Federal Protective Service’s classified polls? Reports on regional protest potential?
Maybe. The fact is, though, Putin doesn’t believe in the system’s ability to get away with another mobilization.
Hence the recruitment of volunteers. It isn’t just another PR campaign.
Our sources suggest the plans of hiring 400,000 troops.
They are expected to be mustered up through regional authorities, and most importantly,
through the HR departments of state-owned companies.
WILD VOLUNTEER CHASE
Oddly enough, this isn’t the first attempt at seeking volunteers.
In late April 2022, it became clear that conquering a country of 40+ million at the hands of 150,000 troops is wishful thinking.
And that was the limit of combat-ready forces the regular army could put up.
That’s when a wacky volunteer wild goose chase kicked off.
Everyone joined the race. The Ministry of Defense offered three-month obligations-free contracts.
Governors introduced the so-called “regional battalions.” Paramilitary organizations, like Wagner Group,
and the National Guard followed suit. Every feudal lord strived to levy the troops. Their attempts had two distinctive features.
First, everyone promised hefty paychecks to volunteers.
In the regions where a middle manager could only hope for $500 a month, soon-to-be warriors were offered $3,000-$4,000.
There were no educational or military prerequisites, no age constraints or physical fitness requirements.
People were offered amounts of money way well out of their league.
A huge chunk of the target audience didn’t even know anyone who earned a comparable amount.
The second common feature: those attempts drew a blank.
There have been no mentions of the “regional battalions” since last fall.
As you may remember, there were reports of national minorities divisions, and even of Moscow Mayor’s regiment.
No one knows its deployment area since June, however.
The largest of those attempts was the formation of the “3rd Army Corps.”
The MoD was picking winos from all over the country and shipped them to a bootcamp at Mulino.
The propaganda machine glamorized the regiment for three straight months,
labeling it an unstoppable force of nature that was about to complete the training, take up the latest arms,
and “liberate” the Donbas.
Meanwhile, the warriors were preoccupied with fighting the public order in Mulino,
splurging their out-of-this-world salaries on booze.
Later on, the “3rd Army Corps” headed to the front, where it went MIA. “MIA” not as in kicked the bucket.
“MIA” as in ever since those good fellas left Mulino, they were never heard from.
It was estimated to consist of 12,000 troops, one infantry division.
Given the hefty PR campaign, the scale of the country, and $3,000–$4,000 salaries.
Naturally, the September mobilization drive was a necessary measure.
They had to resort to it only after every other idea, including a temporary “regional mobilization,” had failed.
Because even with no prerequisites and with enormous salaries, they managed to scrape together only a handful of men,
way below what was needed for the front.
Objectively, now it's an even more challenging time to seek volunteers than it was back then.
Many didn’t realize how serious the war was: Russian TV presented it as a Call of Duty cosplay.
Back then, there were still a number of people who didn’t care about the nature of a job as long as it was lucrative.
And the first wave of mobilization hadn’t drained men from depressed regions yet.
Then, the war may have been perceived by some as a successful endeavor that promised a sense of belonging
to something great alongside the material gains.
Nowadays, the poster children of the war are grown-up bums in rugged uniform that whine
and complain in their video messages.
Not only does it not look victorious, it looks downright repugnant.
Literally, a Russian soldier these days is the last person anyone desires to be even nominally.
Let's bracket the issue of going to a pointless and murderous war in a foreign country altogether.
RISK FACTORS
What does it all mean? It seems like the authorities see mobilization as such a frightening, troublesome,
and risky venture that even the tool that has proved futile appeals more to them.
This is when fear and overconfidence, both cut off from public reality, meet each other.
It’s the fear to announce a mobilization drive in anticipation of upshots more significant than six months ago.
Meanwhile, overconfidence assures them that even though the tool that failed in much more favorable conditions,
the second time may be a charm. Something so stunning that it will outmatch savage conscription raids.
What we see is a good old informational autocracy dog that tries to learn new tricks.
It subconsciously realizes it can’t ace the methods of totalitarian regimes and military dictatorships.
Direct compulsion of citizens into its affairs will be suicidal to it. It’s like giving a toddler a rock drill.
Our senile autocracy believes in the power of propaganda instead.
In its limitless power that would stop at nothing, not even the reality.
The reality for propaganda is akin to a hamster on a collision course with a steamroller.
The hamster rather escapes or takes shape at the steamroller’s will.
“It’s dangerous for us to force them to fight the war,” an autocrat muses. So let’s convince them it’s their dream to do so.
That’s where we shine. We’ve sold them a useless penpusher as a savior of the fatherland.
We’ve sold them Crimea as Russia’s existential goal, its biggest victory ever.
We failed to sell tickets to war as Lucy’s sky of diamonds only for the lack of trying.
Bad news is repeating the same action in search of a contrasting result is a folly.
Similar actions yield similar results.
Volunteer hunt will wind up in spectacular waste on informational campaigns and bring no results.
The front will collapse again. And Putin, knocked down with a feather, will be forced to announce another mobilization drive.
Unfortunately, we can’t predict when this will happen.
September’s collapse of the front and mobilization that followed came out of the blue.
Many were caught off-guard, and had to react in the face of adversity and long odds.
They had to rent bicycles to snake their way through the traffic jam at the Georgian border.
Today, everyone should realize that Putin’s course of action is tied to the Ukrainian army,
a factor beyond his control and planning horizon.
You won’t be warned about the front breakthrough tomorrow and the renewed mobilization the following day.
But you must be prepared for it. It’s not a hypothetical, it’s the most probable outcome.
It boils down to this: if we wish the Ukrainian army to liberate its territories, we must be ready for a new mobilization drive.
There won’t be the former without the latter, unfortunately.
The Kremlin’s actions don’t follow any strategy besides the strategy of self-consolement.
Look, at least we’re doing something! It’s like applying for a micro loan to settle your mortgage payments.
It’ll only protract the inevitable.
The thing is, such a deadbeat only ruins his own life. He pays for his own mistakes.
Putin, on the other hand, will pay for his mistakes with your life. You must be ready for it. Mobilization is unavoidable.
It’s only a question of time for Putin to grasp he can’t ninja his way out any other way.
See you tomorrow!
If you’re still with us, please subscribe to our Patreon to be able to donate.
We’ve seen a dip in donations recently. Your donations help the channel exist and stay independent.
See you tomorrow!