We don’t discuss the situation at the front too often.
But now it has become more political: whispers of an upcoming mobilization drive are on the rise.
Let’s talk about how viable the second wave of mobilization is, considering what’s happening at the frontlines.
Admittedly, comparing this war with WW1 is increasingly appropriate.
Ever since Russia manned the frontlines after the first wave of mobilization,
ever since the Russian troops fortified in Zaporizhzhia region in Southern Ukraine,
a military strategist’s ordeal kicked off.
It’s the stage of positional warfare, with lengthy artillery duels and snail-like infantry advances.
Battles are fought for every village, hamlet, or ruin.
A 100-yard advance takes days and heavy casualties from both sides.
Over the past two weeks, Ukrainian troops have advanced over 3 mi deep into the Russian defenses
in Zaporizhzhia, liberating over 7,000 acres of land, according to DeepStateMap.
Military experts debate if they can consider Ukraine to have broken through the first line
of the Russian defense, and what that “first line” is exactly.
Almost everyone agrees, however, that the AFU managed to advance deep into the Russian defense,
if not breach it.
But here’s a grim fact. Almost 14 mi separate the ruined village of Robotyne under the AFU control,
and the city of Tokmak.
From there, the road opens to Melitopol’, the prime target of the offensive.
That’s another 30 mi. Each one of those miles isn’t like the other, in a military sense.
Some territories are fortified, and some aren’t which greatly affects the pace of advance.
Meanwhile, it’s September. Autumn’s coming, which in Southern Ukraine means torrential
rains filling trenches to the brim, soggy soil that bogs down tanks like no minefield does,
and frosty nights that have to be waited out somewhere inside.
And it’s impossible to predict how successful the AFU’s advance will be while the weather allows.
Since the war started, we all unwillingly had to dabble in military science enough to realize how seasonal
this shebang called war is.
Natural conditions have to be taken into account as much as the opponent’s actions.
The climatic window of opportunity for an offensive isn’t that wide every year.
That’s why simply breaching through the first line of Russian defense, sinking deeper into it,
and expanding the front would be a great success for the AFU.
It appears any hopes for the end of the war, or at least the beginning of the end, are futile.
We’re about to witness another WW1 reenactment, trench warfare and toilsome artillery barrages.
Such confrontation tends not to be resolved on the battlefield.
It lasts until a political decision is made to end it.
That’s bad news for Ukraine. Bad news for Russia, too, considering what it takes to hold the frontline.
It’s done by using all combat-ready forces available.
Even planned strategic exercise Zapad 2023 had to be canceled due to the lack of troops and equipment.
There aren’t enough tanks and manpower for exercising bravado.
The first wave of mobilization in Russia took place about a year ago, Sept. 21 - Oct. 28.
First draftees wound up at the front almost instantly, in a few weeks.
Some were prepared more thoroughly, but by the end of February most of them were on active duty.
Those who haven’t been wounded or killed have been at the front for 6-12 months without rotation
and regular vacations, a subject of complaints of soldiers and their families.
The canceled exercise tells us that regiments of volunteers signing up exist only
in Defense Minister Shoigu’s imagination.
The campaign of luring people into trenches with money drew a blank.
A year in, and the Russian army is back to square one. True, the land is plowed with trenches,
but they’re manned by exhausted soldiers that have no replacements.
And no fibs about successful volunteer recruitment can save the day.
CAN THEY DRAFT?
Is the government ready for another mobilization drive? It depends.
The legal aspect is prepared, lock, stock, and barrel.
All the loopholes that allowed citizens to flip the state off last year have been fixed.
One can’t ignore the draft notice anymore. It’s considered “delivered” by default, and it brings
about all the legal consequences immediately. Prohibition to travel abroad, drive a car,
or run a business will become parts of your daily life.
Failure to appear on such notice will be fined considerably, too.
Moreover, the presidential decree on mobilization hasn’t been canceled.
So the new draft requires no extra legal basis or even public announcement,
Legally speaking, the system is ready. When it comes to logistics, not really.
Enlistment offices digitalization, an almighty database providing the army
with everyone’s traffic violations and medical records? Such technological breakthroughs are yet to happen.
Recent case against Dep. Minister of Digital Development may indicate that digitalization has failed,
and there are reasons.
First, enlistment offices’ dusty manuscripts aren’t that easy to put together.
Second, various institutions’ databases happened to be out of sync.
The third and most important reason is cross-agency competition.
Getting a tender on creation and maintenance of such a database is like finding a crude USD deposit
in your backyard. Personal information is any organization’s most valuable asset.
No government department or affiliated IT office would want to outsource such treasure.
Long story short, while these swindlers are busy clashing over this cornucopia of cash, power,
and corruption potential, there’ll be no digital Gulag at the army’s service.
Which means the military paperwork will remain as messy as it is.
There’s another facet of possible mobilization: politics. And that’s where the system fails miserably.
The 2023 regional elections campaign stands out with its taboo on three words: “special military operation.”
Only the regime’s candidate in the Khakassia region tried to ride the wave of jingoism.
He sported a camo outfit until the polls hinted to stop.
He seemed to take it to heart, and was hospitalized. He withdrew from the election.
No one advocates for crusades and holy wars anymore. If Russian-speaking extraterrestrials had a look
at the electoral campaign and listened to the speakers, it’d never cross their minds that the country is at war.
There’s no surprise. When polls differ from “Would you rather support storming Kyiv,
or get 15 years behind the bars,” when it comes to elections, political strategists
harbor no illusions about public sentiment.
We discussed this a lot, but current electoral campaigns present us with a palpable proof.
Domestic policy managers don’t live in fairyland, and, despite the whims and needs of the military,
do their best to avoid mobilization and omit the war topic altogether.
Which means the Defense ministry will have to make due.
They have a few cards up their sleeves: a handful of professional soldiers, a few convicts,
who aren’t as eager to fight for the ministry as they were to fight for murdered Prigozhin
who offered a much better contract.
They may promise Russian citizenship to coax immigrants to fight, or weasel some other way.
Whatever they do, that’d be a few thousand troops a month, while the army needs a hundred times more.
The forces at the front are no longer coping with their tasks.
Meanwhile the AFU is advancing, slowly but steadily.
WAR OF ATTRITION
What’s the conclusion? The situation is dire for both sides.
The AFU faced powerful Russian fortifications, namely unprecedentedly vast minefields.
Their area and density are a serious barrier to Ukrainian forces.
Only this week they managed to reach the anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth.
Meanwhile the Russian army can’t replenish its reserves and provide soldiers with rest due to political reasons.
The Defense ministry may request whatever number of soldiers, but the closer we are
to presidential elections in March 2024, the stronger political considerations will be,
which boil down to ignoring the war at all costs.
That’s the war of attrition indeed, and each side is facing exhaustion in its own way.
Ukraine still goes through a diplomatic nightmare when trying to step up the allies’ arms supplies.
The last offensive was conducted with a limited number of armored vehicles and no western aircraft.
And while Russia can afford losing tanks and armored vehicles by the truckload, for Ukraine,
losing every Bradley or Leopard means heavy damage, both physical and reputational.
They’ve invested too much political capital into getting them.
As for Russia, it failed to replenish the frontlines with fresh troops.
It’s hard to say what’s worse for the state: to start a new mobilization draft before
the war mastermind’s most important political trial, or let the fatigue reach insane levels.
After all, the draft campaign last yearturned out to be a tough political challenge.
Let me emphasize: it’s all political speculations. It’s dangerous to apply them to your personal life.
When it comes to life and death, relying on political probabilities is suicidal.
Odds of mobilization, however slim, still remain. Moreover, it may start as you watch this video.
We’re talking about a single person’s whims after all.
If you or your beloved ones can hypothetically be drafted, tone down political reasoning
and prepare for conscription to kick off tomorrow.
When two opposing armies are at the limit of their capabilities and are physically unable to turn the tide,
the war reaches a stage when nothing happens besides devastating casualties.
The stage when there’s no news of taking over significant points, but the bloodbath becomes routine.
Ukraine’s upper hand here is goal setting. Ukraine fights for survival and independence.
Whatever problems its army, society, and elites are facing,
they pale in comparison with horrors of occupation and loss of sovereignty.
The end of the war doesn’t bode badly for Russian society and elites.
The only problem we have is Vladimir Putin. Ukraine has no choice but to defeat Russia on the battlefield,
but Russia doesn’t have to defeat Ukraine.
It has to get rid of a single specimen driven cuckoo by power and isolation.
See you tomorrow!