Yesterday, war blogger Andrei “Murz” Morozov took his own life.
He was fighting against Ukraine for the entire decade of hostilities and remained one of only a handful of pro-war reporters
who, unlike the MoD spokesman Lt. Gen. Konashenkov and Vladimir Solovyov, was telling the truth.
His was a public suicide.
The decision came on the heels of a major stir caused by Morozov’s social media post about Avdiivka.
He claimed that over the five-month battle for whatever remained of a small town, the Russian army’s death toll (16,000)
equaled that of the entire Soviet–Afghan War.
The figure instantly went viral.
Solovyov Live propagandists clamored to have Morozov punished for the potential adverse effect
of his revelations on the army’s combat-readiness.
Like, the servicemembers may refuse to follow the orders or, worse, begin to question the MoD’s official data.
In response to that, the pro-war blogger dared the propagandists to shoot him dead, should they have proven he was lying.
Alternatively, he suggested taking his own life as long as the military prosecutors would probe into the senseless loss of life.
No one replied to it. After that, Murz posted what would be his suicide note saying that Russia is an enemy-occupied state.
The pro-war blogger phenomenon as well as what's become of it and why they are going through a rough patch now
will be the subject of a different video.
Today, we’ll talk about the battlefield updates.
For five harrowing months, the Russian high command
was having the entire Russian units slaughtered at Avdiivka to drive away the Ukrainian army.
Today, we’ll assess the Russian tactic and provide you with battlefield updates.
Two years into the invasion, the belligerents are almost locked in a stalemate, but the intensity of the fighting hasn’t subsided.
The war has entered a new stage.
According to Western media, Ukraine is now facing the worst odds ever since the war started.
Military analysts concur that in 2024, the best-case scenario for Ukraine will be holding up the frontlines.
They say that grueling engagements, like the one at Bakhmut, won’t be the right tactic for Ukraine.
Several days ago, the Russian army captured Avdiivka.
For a long time, the town that used to be home to 30,000 residents was the only Ukrainian-controlled suburb of Donetsk.
The place had been a battleground since 2014.
The Russian began attacking the town on day one of the 2022 invasion.
But October 2023 saw the start of a battle that was a spitting image of the battle of Bakhmut.
It took the Russians over five months to encircle the town almost entirely as a result of countless attacks on the Ukrainian defenses.
And once Ukrainians were about to be trapped in a pocket, Ukraine’s troops withdrew from Avdiivka.
According to The New York Times, the Ukrainian army has hit a psychological low.
Meatgrinder-style attacks or not, the Russian offensive is ratcheting up.
Vuhledar, an important fortified compound and the focal point of the southern and eastern fronts, may be their next target.
That being said, according to The Washington Post, the Ukrainian army is understaffed.
Ukraine’s top generals admit that ceaseless attacks could breach their defenses.
Expecting battlefield gains would be wishful thinking.
Worse still, the Russian army may launch a large counteroffensive similar to what Ukrainians did at Kharkiv in September 2022.
Meanwhile, Russian propagandists keep guessing
where the Ukrainian defensive effort is at its most vulnerable, whether it’s the south or the east.
The Ukrainian command, in turn, admits that things aren’t looking bright. Kyrylo Budanov,
Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, confirms that the army is in need of a fresh consciption drive to keep up its effort.
But the Ukrainian public isn’t exactly enthusiastic about the prospect.
People are no longer volunteering to go to war.
Moreover, the Ukrainian army is critically short on ammunition.
International media outlets and experts have been talking about the “shell hunger” for quite a while now.
Ukrainian analyst Mykola Bielieskov suggests that the Ukrainian army may only be able to hold back the Russians using attack drones,
which is a gamble because you can hardly make up for the shortage of ammo this way.
For all the novel armaments of this war, like FPV drones, artillery has been and is likely to be the biggest factor.
Let’s keep rolling
Military analysts, e.g. the ones at the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
believe Ukraine will be embroiled in its defensive effort throughout 2024.
It needs to hold back the Russians and replenish its manpower and firepower to continue resistance in 2025.
Analysts note that the Ukrainian army (UAF) should stay away from battles of attrition,
like the at Bakhmut and Avdiivka, even though it’ll be hard to avoid, should the Russians initiate them.
Experts at the Carnegie Endowment warn of potential threats
and insist that Ukraine and its Western allies should learn from the past mistakes.
Last summer, a lot of hopes were pinned on the Ukrainian offensive, which eventually laid an egg.
The allies supplied Ukraine with a series of military aid packages.
Today, the support is still there, but the figures are going down.
A recent poll conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations showed
that, for all their support, Europeans doubt that Ukraine can win this war.
A mere 10% of those polled believe in Ukraine’s victory, while 20% think Russia will emerge victorious.
Most of the polled believe Kyiv and Moscow will eventually hammer out a compromise.
That’s why Eugene Rumer, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment,
calls on the allies to legislate military aid to Ukraine for the upcoming years,
reducing its dependence on the West’s public sentiment.
Rumer cites the U.K.–Ukraine 10-year security agreement on London’s military aid and military cooperation efforts.
Recently, France and Germany signed similar agreements with Ukraine.
The rest of the G7 countries are expected to follow suit.
Kyiv, in turn, strives to be less dependent on Western military assistance.
Instead, the government seeks to rebuild the Soviet defense factories that were part abandoned and part destroyed by Russia’s strikes.
The restored facilities will be used to build licensed Western-grade armaments.
But it’s not going to happen fast.
While Kyiv is reaching out to the U.S. manufacturers, the restoration of the facilities is being handled by the Ministry of Strategic Industries.
New agreements, if any, are kept under wraps.
The catch here is that it’s not going to work in the nearest future.
It won’t boost the shortage of ammo that needs to be fixed now.
The new aid package Ukraine is expecting from the U.S. is being blocked by the Republicans.
As for now, President Zelenskyy will discuss the 2024 strategy
with the country’s military and political leaders at the Feb. 25 conference that’ll feature leading public figures, top generals,
intel agency chiefs, ministers, and senior parliamentarians.
This is going to be the first major conference since the start of the war.
Previously, the key decisions were made at the Commander-in-Chief’s HQ meetings
that involved the highest-ranked generals and top political figures.
From what we already know from Kyrylo Budanov,
Ukraine is planning to keep up its defensive effort in the east.
Russia doesn’t have enough manpower and materiel to occupy the entire Donbas.
Mykola Bielieskov believes things aren’t looking disastrous for Ukraine in the longer term.
After all, the agreements signed with the U.K., France, and Germany
prove that European elites are increasingly viewing the armament of Ukraine as part of their national interests.
What is the likely scenario for the 2024 campaign?
By the looks of it, the Russian army may undertake a new offensive.
Chances are, the top brass will be looking for vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defenses.
Ukraine, in turn, may resort to an asymmetric response and take the fight to the skies.
The Russian skies, to be clear.
While last year many analysts struggled to figure out the rationale of the Ukrainian drone strikes,
like the ones on the Moscow City towers, things are getting clearer now.
Ukraine has ramped up the production of heavy drones capable of bypassing the air defense systems, carrying 50 kilos of explosives.
Such drones are targeting large objects.
Analysts at the Atlantic Council point to the recent attacks where the Ukrainian drones struck oil terminals in Ust-Luga and Tuapse
and oil refineries deep into Russian territory.
This marks a new approach targeting Russia’s energy assets and capabilities.
Experts point out that Russia has already found ways to mitigate the effects of the oil depot strikes.
However, Verstka reports that the Ukrainian drones’ capabilities have been amped up starting in September 2023.
Now they can reach St. Petersburg, Veliky Novgorod, and Yaroslavl.
According to the Atlantic Council’s analysis, though, most of the drones are downed by the air defense systems.
Sergei Vakulenko, an expert at the Carnegie Endowment, claims that these strikes won’t lead to an energy crisis.
Once struck, Russian oil refineries won’t just blow up.
These are heavily protected facilities built to the Cold War era standards, which are designed to withstand a missile strike.
The ensuing fires get quickly put out. Importantly, though, the drone strikes may disable the oil refinery equipment,
most of which was produced in the West and has been sanctioned.
Russia and even China won’t be able to replace it.
So, we may be looking at a drawn-out standoff
between the sword in Ukrainian drones and the shield in the Russian air defense systems and oil refinery protection.
Something similar happened in 2023
as Russia sought to disable Ukraine’s power grid and leave the country without electricity, water, and central heating.
Despite the massive damage, the Ukrainian power grid survived the attacks.
The scale of Ukrainian strikes on the Russian infrastructure is now far smaller.
Russia is also gearing up for aerial warfare.
Recently, the Russian army started using the brand-new Zircon hypersonic missiles
The missile’s breakneck speed leaves little time for the air defense systems to detect it, calculate its path, and shoot it down.
Moreover, a Russian facility began manufacturing the Iranian Shahed pusher-prop drones.
The leaked documents show that the factory is expected to produce 10 drones a day.
Several thousand drones per year will be a solid figure, given that the facility performs up to the target.
If the plan pans out, Russia will be producing arguably the main loitering munition of this war.
That’s the way things stand militarily. That’s what Putin will be trying to implement in 2024.
As can be seen from the Tucker Carlson interview,
he’s more focused on interacting with the Western leaders that want the military aid to Ukraine to be cut short.
It means the war extends beyond the strictly military theaters. It’s unfolding in the international political arena, too.
If Putin breezes through the March election, the war effort may undergo some serious change.
Putin may announce a new conscription drive.
Politics-wise, it’ll be a tough call for Russia.
But in a dictatorship, the odds are, public opinion won’t matter.
Recruiting hundreds of thousands of personnel can both spark a political crisis in Russia and affect battlefield scenarios.
We’ll be keeping a watchful eye on things to come.
See you tomorrow!